What is 'Offshore'? International Tax Evasion and Avoidance and How to Combat it by Picciotto, Sol
This briefing aims to explain the ‘offshore’ 
system which enables both evasion and 
avoidance of tax, as well as of other types 
of laws and regulations, and discusses 
countermeasures. All illicit cross-border 
financial flows exploit the offshore system, 
so understanding how it works is the 
key to ensuring effective and coherent 
countermeasures, in relation to tax, money-
laundering and corruption. It was written as 
a submission to the United Nations High 
Level Panel on Financial Accountability, 
Transparency & Integrity. 
Offshore: an in-between 
space
National taxes on income, profits or gains 
usually apply to income defined by its source, 
or persons (individuals or legal entities) 
based on their country of residence or 
citizenship. Other kinds of rules, such as those 
on bribery and money-laundering, are usually 
also based on residence or citizenship, and/or 
the place where the activity takes place. 
From early in the 20th century, when states 
started to rely on income taxes, wealthy 
individuals and transnational corporations 
(TNCs) began to find ways to evade or 
avoid them. The basic technique was to 
interpose an intermediary entity or conduit 
between the source of income and its 
beneficial owner. This could ensure that 
such income would not be taxed in either 
the source or residence country. The conduit 
could be a nominee account, or a legal 
person such as a company, or a trust. Such 
conduits are legal fictions, existing only on 
paper, electronically, or as brass plates on 
an office building. These assets can be used 
to generate income or gains from another 
country, to benefit persons resident in a 
third country. Generally, a chain of conduits 
is used, in a ‘stepping-stone’ structure, to 
avoid withholding taxes at source as well 
as residence tax (see Figure 1). It’s also 
possible for a person to use an offshore 
structure to avoid tax in their own country of 
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Hence, ‘offshore’ is not a place but a system or 
legal structure, enabling people or companies 
based or living in high-tax countries to pay low 
tax. Different kinds of haven are generally used 
in combination, and almost any country can be 
a haven in some way and to some extent. That 
is why ‘blacklists’ of havens are of limited use. 
Much better tools are the Financial Secrecy 
Index, which ranks countries by factors reflecting 
their importance in the offshore system (FSI 
2020), and the EU’s Directive on reportable 
cross-border tax avoidance arrangements 
(EU 2018), which specifies the basic offshore 
structures based on their ‘hallmarks’.
Although commonly thought of as small 
countries, portrayed as palm-fringed islands, 
countries of all sizes can act as havens, 
by providing offshore facilities. The central 
characteristic of offshore laws or regulations is 
that they benefit non-residents of the country. 
They can be deliberately designed to do so, 
or the benefit may simply result from limiting 
the scope of national rules to residents of the 
country. For example, in 1934 Switzerland’s 
political and financial elites decided to reinforce 
its role as an offshore banking centre, which 
began early last century, by enacting a bank 
secrecy law criminalising any disclosure of 
information on clients (Farquet 2012, Guex 
2000). Other jurisdictions have also passed 
strong secrecy laws to attract financial deposits 
from non-residents. Several European states, 
particularly the UK and the Netherlands, allowed 
or encouraged their colonies or dependencies to 
offer offshore facilities, which also benefited their 
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Figure 1 Basic offshore ‘stepping-stone’ structure
Assets (capital, intellectual property rights etc.) are assigned at the direction of the Parent to a base entity resident in a zero-tax 
country, which lends or licenses them to the Operating Company via a conduit resident in a country with suitable tax treaties; 
the interest or royalties paid by the Operating Company reduce its tax on business profits, and are exempt from tax in the 
source country (due to the treaty); the Conduit also pays no or very little tax, passing the income through to the Base, where it is 
sheltered from Residence country tax, while being available to the ultimate owner.
Residence country
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Countries with large financial centres have 
also offered offshore facilities, by providing 
stronger protection of client confidentiality for 
non-residents. Confidentiality can usually be 
overridden by obligations to disclose information 
to tax and criminal enforcement authorities; 
but many countries refused to obtain such 
information to help other countries enforce their 
laws. Such obligations began to be accepted 
only relatively recently, for example the UK 
did so for tax matters only in 2000. Secrecy is 
also enabled by the lack in most countries of 
public registers of the owners or beneficiaries 
of legal entities such as companies, trusts 
or foundations. Hence, it is still possible to 
circumvent arrangements for exchange of 
information by owning assets through an entity 
in a jurisdiction with no register of beneficial 
ownership. Most US states have no corporate 
ownership register, and few countries require 
disclosure of the parties to trusts.
The grey zones: planning, 
avoidance and evasion
Using offshore arrangements may sometimes be 
proved illegal, under either civil or more rarely 
criminal law. For example, ‘round tripping’ is likely 
to be illegal. More often, such arrangements 
are designed to exploit legal ‘grey areas’ that 
result from the malleability of the abstract legal 
concepts, particularly residence and source. For 
example, the beneficiaries of an offshore trust 
can claim to have no income from abroad, even 
if the trustees invest its assets as they direct and 
use the income for their benefit. It is particularly 
difficult to prove that an arrangement is criminal, 
because this usually requires evidence of 
intent to break the law, or knowledge that the 
arrangement is contrary to law. 
Wealthy persons or corporations can pay 
professionals to devise structures that can 
plausibly be argued to be within the law. The 
worse that can happen is that the arrangements 
may be investigated and if challenged may be 
found ineffective or unlawful. Since there is 
usually no penalty, especially if they are based 
on legal advice, entering into such arrangements 
entails little or no risk. At the worst, tax may 
eventually have to be paid, but meantime it is 
deferred. Hence, corporations have considered 
it legitimate to engage in avoidance, often 
described as tax ‘planning’. Some even argue 
that they are required to do so in pursuit of profit. 
Both international tax evasion and avoidance 
use the offshore system, deploying similar 
techniques that are linked and overlap. The 
frequent claim that tax avoidance is legal is 
mistaken. Tax avoidance arrangements are 
frequently unlawful, in that they do not succeed 
in avoiding tax. However, this greatly depends 
on the resources available for tax audit and 
investigation. The UN Financing for Sustainable 
Development report 2020 points out that data 
from the International Survey on Revenue 
Administration show that a high proportion of 
tax audits identify underreported taxes, although 
they rarely result in prosecutions for evasion 
(UN 2020, pp. 42-3). The data also show higher 
success rates for low-income countries, although 
obviously such countries lack the capacity for 
frequent audits, so much unlawful avoidance is 
undetected. 
Hence, there is inevitably a ‘dark figure’ of 
tax that has been avoided or evaded without 
detection. When this occurs by using an offshore 
arrangement, it can be considered an illicit 
financial flow. It may result from ineffective 
enforcement, due to lack of resources or other 
reasons (including corruption), or from ineffective 
laws, sometimes in combination. Other kinds 
of illicit flows may also involve tax evasion or 
avoidance, so there is an overlap among these 
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categories, which should be taken into account in 
analysing and quantifying them. 
A good example of the grey zones is the 
so-called Cum-Ex trading scheme which 
exploited double taxation relief and is estimated 
to have cost various European countries a 
total of some €60 billion, around half of that 
for Germany (Siegal 2020). This scheme was 
certified as legal by elite law firm Freshfields 
Bruckhaus, and has required enormous efforts 
by enforcement authorities to unmask, as well 
as amendments to legislation. Two bankers 
were finally convicted in late 2019, but they 
cooperated with prosecutors so received only 
suspended sentences (Storbeck 2020). Legal 
arguments can still be made that the facilitators 
committed no criminal offence, and even that the 
scheme was within the law.
The systematisation of 
offshore
The basis for offshore emerged during the 
period of high tax rates after the first world war. 
In addition to bank secrecy, some countries 
began to provide exemption from tax on foreign 
income for ‘holding companies’: Luxembourg 
enacted such legislation in 1929, and Swiss 
cantonal laws had the same effect, in partnership 
with Lichtenstein (Farquet 2017, 233-4). US 
lawyers enabled Panama to become a ‘flag of 
convenience’ for ships, to avoid labour legislation 
as well as tax, and later alcohol prohibition.
Following the second world war TNCs, especially 
from the US, further developed the offshore 
system to expand internationally despite 
restrictions on capital movements. For example, 
a US court decision considering a tax avoidance 
structure through a Swiss affiliate created by 
the US-based chemicals giant Du Pont in 1959, 
found an internal memo that stated: 
‘It would seem desirable to bill the tax haven 
subsidiary [in Switzerland] at less than an 
“arm’s length” price, because: (1) the pricing 
might not be challenged by the revenue 
agent; (2) if the pricing is challenged, we 
might sustain such transfer prices; (3) if we 
cannot sustain the prices used, a transfer 
price will be negotiated which should not be 
more than an “arm’s length” price and might 
well be less; thus we would be no worse off 
than we would have been had we billed at 
the higher price’.(Du Pont 1979, p.447).
This viewpoint became prevalent among TNCs 
and their tax advisers as early as the 1950s, 
leading to the systematisation of the use of 
offshore structures. 
The use of offshore grew with the relaxation of 
currency and capital movement controls, and 
became generalised in the 1980s. International 
attempts to control the offshore system began 
in the 1990s, e.g. through the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF, set up in 1989) and the 
Egmont Group (set up in 1995) to deal with 
money-laundering, and by the Basle Committee 
on Banking Supervision for financial prudence 
standards. However, the tax aspects were taken 
less seriously, and the G8/OECD project on 
‘harmful tax practices’ begun in 1996 resulted 
only in some improvements in exchange of 
tax information on demand. There was little 
coordination between tax authorities and those 
responsible for financial supervision. The FATF 
did not extend its reporting standards to tax 
until 2012, and then only for ‘tax crimes’. The 
improvements in financial supervision enabled 
havens to proclaim their high standards and so 
strengthen their attractiveness, while continuing 
to resist cooperation in tax enforcement.
At the same time, TNCs further refined their 
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a fundamental flaw in international tax rules. 
When these laws were devised in the 1920s 
it was understood that TNCs are unitary firms 
operating under central direction and control, so 
tax authorities were given the power to adjust the 
accounts of their local subsidiaries or branches 
in each country to ensure a fair allocation of 
the global profit. However, it was agreed to 
focus on the accounts of each national affiliate, 
adjusted to ensure that they showed a level of 
profit in line with similar independent companies. 
In practice this gave a green light for TNCs to 
set up offshore entities, which expanded from 
the 1950s. This was further encouraged by the 
Guidelines on Transfer Pricing issued by the 
OECD in 1995. These reinforced the ‘arm’s 
length’ principle, requiring the attribution of 
profits to be based on analysis of the functions 
performed by each affiliate and on the pricing of 
transactions between them. TNC tax advisers 
built on this to create even more complex 
corporate structures, fragmenting activities and 
locating affiliates fulfilling high-value functions 
in low-tax countries (Picciotto 2018, pp. 40-42). 
This was further facilitated by the digitalisation of 
the economy, which made offshoring easier.
Combatting the offshore 
system
More determined efforts have been made to 
combat the offshore system in the past decade, 
due to the political pressures created by the 
fiscal crises following the great financial crash 
of 2007-9 (Picciotto 2020). These have aimed at 
both tax evasion by rich people and avoidance 
by TNCs. While great strides have been made, 
more still needs to be done to make these 
measures effective, especially for developing 
countries. It is also important to improve the 
coherence between tax measures and those 
aimed at money-laundering and corruption.
Comprehensive automatic 
exchange of tax information
The OECD’s Common Reporting Standard 
(CRS), established in 2014, provides a basis 
for automatic exchange of financial account 
information for tax purposes between all 
countries, supervised by the Global Forum, 
based at the OECD. This is a major step forward, 
but significant improvement is needed.
In 2019, 95 countries participated in exchanges, 
but this still does not include most developing 
countries. A major gap is that the USA is not 
participating, so its own system under the Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) is not 
subject to peer review. The Global Forum’s peer 
reviews of the exchange of information on request 
have found the US only ‘partially compliant’ on the 
availability of ownership and identity information. 
Also, the US bilateral agreements under the 
FATCA are asymmetrical, the information supplied 
by the US to its partners does not comply with the 
CRS, and is less than it receives (Knobel 2016, 
pp.13-14). The US has 113 agreements in force 
under the FATCA, but only 98 that provide for 
even this limited degree of reciprocity. 
This still falls well short of a global system: only four 
African countries have participated in the OECD 
system by the end of 2019 (Ghana, Mauritius, 
Seychelles and South Africa), and six have 
agreements with the US (Algeria, Angola, Cabo 
Verde, Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa). 
Recommendations: (i) To improve coherence 
and alignment the US should either join the CRS 
system, or ensure full reciprocity and participate 
in the peer reviews by the Global Forum; (ii) a 
major effort is needed to build the capacity of 
developing countries to participate in the CRS, 
and particularly to enable them to make good 
use of information they would receive through it.
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Beneficial ownership
The very existence of automatic exchange of 
information is an important deterrent, but its 
sustainability and effectiveness depend on the 
quality of the information. The key to this is 
transparency of legal persons and arrangements, 
to ensure that information is provided on the 
real individual who is the beneficial owner (BO) 
of income. The CRS covers only accounts 
with financial institutions, and the quality of 
the information exchanged relies on accurate 
identification of beneficiaries. 
The Global Forum has adopted the FATF 
Guidance on Beneficial Ownership (FATF 
2014) which, together with its Best Practices 
guidance (FATF 2019) recommends a 3-pronged 
approach to identification of BOs. One of these 
utilises ownership registers (for companies), 
the others depend on obligations for financial 
institutions, companies or professional service 
providers to hold and supply the data when 
required. Although they recommend combined 
use of all three sources, neither the FATF nor 
the CRS require the establishment of ownership 
registries, nor do the High-Level Principles on 
BO Transparency adopted by the G20 leaders 
in 2014. Hence, in most countries identification 
of beneficial owners largely relies on service 
providers or financial institutions, many of which 
have been found delinquent in the past. Also, 
determined evaders can still hide behind layers 
of entities and nominees. 
The international standards clearly show 
that a key element in an effective system is 
the establishment of public registries. Due to 
political pressures, in 2018 the EU amended 
its money-laundering Directive to require public 
registers for companies, trusts and other legal 
entities, and in May 2020 adopted an Action Plan 
for a comprehensive policy, including EU-level 
supervision. Some other countries have adopted 
such policies, such as the Ukraine.
Recommendations: (i) monitoring of the CRS 
should include evaluation of the quality of 
compliance by financial intermediaries with the 
requirement to identify beneficial owners; (ii) 
both the FATF and the CRS should require the 
establishment of public registries of beneficial 
ownership of legal entities, and of other assets, 
available for searching online; (iii) the FATF and 
CRS should establish a limit on the ‘layering’ 
of legal entities, by obliging participating 
jurisdictions to require that participation in a 
legal entity by other than a natural person is 
permissible only if the ultimate BOs in that entity 
can be ascertained; and (iv) there should be 
further strengthening of cooperation between 
authorities responsible for tax and money-
laundering, both at international level (OECD and 
FATF) and national level (e.g. through improving 
the sharing of data between revenue authorities 
and financial information units).
Ending TNCs’ use of 
offshore structures
The Tax Annex to the G20 world leaders 
Declaration in 2013 mandated the OECD Action 
Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) to 
reform international tax rules to ensure that TNCs 
could be taxed ‘where economic activities occur 
and value is created’. This clearly requires ending 
TNCs’ use of offshore arrangements. Unfortunately, 
the first outcomes of the BEPS project in 2015 
only patched up existing rules. In particular, the 
arm’s length principle was retained, with extensive 
amendments to the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
which only made them even more complex. 
The main advance was the establishment of a 
system of Country-by-Country reports (CbCR) 
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an overview of all the TNC’s affiliates in every 
country, and the assets, employees, income and 
tax paid and due in each country. However, the 
CbCRs are delivered to the tax authority of the 
TNC’s home country, and access is available 
only to tax authorities of other countries 
participating in a system run by the OECD, 
which polices compliance with its rules. These 
include strict requirements of confidentiality, 
as well as insistence that countries apply the 
arm’s length principle and the OECD approach 
to transfer pricing. Consequently, very few 
developing countries are able to receive CbCRs 
(in Africa only Mauritius, Seychelles and South 
Africa). The CbCR scheme is under review this 
year by the G20, but the consultation document 
issued by the OECD does not propose any 
improvement in transparency of the reports. 
Nevertheless, the many submissions by civil 
society organisations to this consultation, as 
well as some by small business and others, 
strongly urged that CbCRs should be public. 
CbCRs contain high-level information, so could 
not reasonably be considered commercially 
confidential. The Global Reporting Initiative 
has issued a standard for corporate public 
disclosure on tax which includes a template 
for CbCR (GRI 2019), which is close to that of 
the OECD. This was developed in consultation 
with TNCs and stakeholders, and has support 
from many in the business and investment 
communities, but it is voluntary. 
The work on the BEPS project on international 
tax implications of digitalisation of the economy 
reached the important conclusions that (i) the 
whole economy has been affected, not just a 
particular sector, and (ii) it has exacerbated the 
problems of existing tax rules. The continuing 
work is focusing on the central principles of 
taxable nexus and allocation of profits of TNCs. 
The latest proposals have moved towards more 
simplified methods of allocation, starting from 
the TNC’s global profits, which is a significant 
step forward. However, they still envisage a 
continuing important role for existing transfer 
pricing methods, which provide a perverse 
incentive for TNCs to devise complex offshore 
structures. 
Effective taxation of TNCs should be based on 
treating them in accordance with the economic 
reality that they are unitary firms under 
centralised control. Three methods of unitary 
taxation were evaluated by the Independent 
Commission for the Reform of International 
Corporate Taxation (ICRICT 2019), which 
concluded that the fairest and most effective 
method would be formulary apportionment. 
The G24 group of developing countries has put 
forward proposals for apportionment based on 
a balance of factors of production (employees, 
users, working capital) and consumption (sales). 
Due to the Covid crisis efforts to achieve an 
agreed solution this year are likely to focus on 
the specific problem of highly digitalised firms, 
but it is hoped that a wider solution could be 
found in the near future.
Recommendations: (i) the G20 should this year 
require publication of country-by-country reports; 
(ii) the BEPS project should develop principles 
for formulary apportionment of TNC profits along 
the lines of the G24 proposals.
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Effective taxation of 
TNCs should be based 
on treating them in 
accordance with the 
economic reality that they 
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